Ten years ago, the nations of the Balkans were taken by another political spasm and, incapable of finding the new formula for their survival, reached for historically tested methods of ethnic divisions and wars. The centripetal forces that grasped the Yugoslav Federation, drawing their strength from democracy and the wish for independence, but also from fear, ethnic intolerance and struggle for territories, split the Federation and then penetrated the republics that, in the meantime, became sovereign states. Moving from north to south, these powerful currents that ventured to split societies along ethnic lines are now in Kosovo, their starting point. Thus, in the last ten years, the history of the Balkan nations has experienced another of its bloody repetitions. Ironically, this took place at a time when it was believed that the road to a united and democratic Europe was finally open. The road is open, but the heavy historical burden on the nations in the Balkans produces many dilemmas as to the character of the encounter between the two Europes, the Eastern and the Western.

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Encounter between two Europes with different historical heritage

One could say that the present division into Eastern and Western Europe dates from the 16^th century, when the then center of the world moved from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. While the nations from the western part of Europe became the main actors and beneficiaries of the fruits of the commercial revolution, thus creating the material base of the future industrial and democratic revolutions, those from the eastern part lagged behind. The European periphery - Western Europe - has become the center and the center - Eastern Europe - has become the periphery of the Continent. In the centuries to come, the different economic and social processes produced different political institutions and different political values. This was clearly evinced in the state-society relation. Namely, while "western conditions" produced pluralism and fragmentation of power, meaning a strong (civil) society, "eastern conditions" produced a strong state and a weak society. These are the dominating trends that created a different political tradition and a different political moral in the two parts of the Continent, in spite of the presence of the elements of both processes throughout Europe.

The political ethics that originated from Western European soil can be summarized with the thesis that societies are entitled to participate in the formulation of the policy of the state and, in the course of the evolution of democracy, define how to allocate the wealth created by the nation. In the course of several centuries, and not without drawbacks, the rights and the freedoms of men become part of the political moral of Western Europe. On the other hand, Eastern Europe experiences a different development. Geographically located between Western Europe and the Orient, this was the meeting point between western tradition of power division and eastern tradition of power concentration. But, the dominant characteristic of the political life of Eastern Europe became a strong state with numerous discretion rights. It also marks the beginning of the domination of bureaucracy over various domains of people’s life - policy, economy, religion…. And while freedom in Western Europe is an achievement of the citizens organized in a civil society, that is to say groups that are independent from the power of the state, in Eastern Europe it is the accomplishment of the state. For centuries back, the reforms have been, as a rule, initiated from above, which is the reason for their short range. Namely, the heavy hand of bureaucracy interrupted change whenever it imperiled its privileged position; that is to say whenever it crossed the limits of allowed freedom.

These processes have influenced the beliefs and the values of individuals, thus creating a specific "eastern" mentality. People have regarded the state, regardless of its ideological character, as an institution that provides the individual with the desired degree of security and well being at a lower price than independent economic or political activity. Moreover, the desire to be part of the state came from awareness that there were no serious (democratic) restrictions as regards the ways for seizing power or using it for making personal gain. A continuation of this authoritarian heritage was the recent totalitarian Eastern European history that lasted until the moment the center in Moscow collapsed under the pressure of unsolved economic, social, political, and ethnic problems. After the fall of the one-party dictatorships in Eastern Europe, and the advent of democracy, conflicts suppressed under the surface of political life - serious defects of the political and economic system, unresolved ethnic tensions, border problems, irredentism, nationalism - emerged. Standing amidst this chaos, the nations of Eastern Europe faced a serious dilemma at the beginning of the 90's: How to resolve society’s problems in a democratic way?

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The crisis and the position of Yugoslavia in international politics

With the collapse of the bipolar world at the end of the 1980's, the unique international position of Yugoslavia as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and occasionally an important "messenger" between the two blocs collapsed as well. Democracy, but also demagogy, set free the national emotions of its constituent nations that soon came into a conflict with the narrow framework of the political organization of the one-party federation. The scene was set for a conflict and the course of events depended on the wisdom and the capability of the leaders of the federal units to resolve conflicts in a peaceful way. As it turned out, wisdom and capability lacked. Instead of a peaceful separation, once it became obvious that life in a common state was impossible, a series of wars broke out. This chain of events, instigated from the highest political positions, contributed to the loss of interest for maintaining any form of cooperation among the republics that might have prevented the war and the subsequent economic crash. It seems as though the desire of the leaders of the republics for their own state, immediately and at any price, was stronger than their care for the life and well being of their peoples. They were all caught up in the euphoria that resulted from the sheer idea for their own state. The motives were the same as those that Thucyidides, Machiavelli, and Hobbs had written about -power, profit and glory.

The beginning of the events that led to the wars in former Yugoslavia coincided with the end of the successful intervention of the allied troops in the Gulf crisis led by the United States. Could a similar reaction be expected in Yugoslavia as well? It turned out that the imperiled vital "oil" interests of the industrial countries provoked the efficient US reaction, and that a similar reaction could not be expected in Yugoslavia. The Americans did not hide this. At the meeting with the embroiled leaderships of the Yugoslav republics in 1991, moving from one to another room in the Federal Government building, James Baker addressed the Macedonian delegation. Stating that the political leaders of the Yugoslav republics should do their best to prevent war, which is always easy to start but difficult to end, he also stated that nobody should expect America to get involved in a possible war. By concluding that twice during the 20^th century US soldiers died on European soil, Baker said that among American politicians and the country’s public opinion there was no will to see this happen for a third time. Did these sobering words of a reasonable man have a positive effect on the conflicting sides? Later, it became clear that this frankness could be and was abused by the more powerful to impose their solution. Would the consequences have been different had Baker, before the war started, threatened with an U.S. intervention against those who broke the will of the West - to resolve the problems with peaceful means? It is possible. However, statesmen protect the reputation of their country, which can be endangered if events show that its political representatives do not keep their word. Thus, the problem was left for the Europeans who, according to Luxembourg minister and the then chairperson, believed were capable of doing.

Alas, at the beginning of the last decade of the 20^th century, the European Community had the experience of integration but not of disintegration of the kind that was taking place in Yugoslavia. The lack of a common foreign policy, as a result of the absence of a common vision for the problems of the Continent, as well as the lack of efficient institutional decision-making mechanisms, soon became evident. The anecdote about Kissinger who, at somebody's remark that Europe thinks this or that, asked for the impossible: its telephone number - casts light on the relations in the Community. But, in spite of its drawbacks, and with all the conflicting views of its members, Europe tried to resolve the problems of the hostile leaderships of the republics in a peaceful manner. It summoned the Conference on former Yugoslavia headed by Peter Carrington, former defense minister of Great Britain and former NATO Secretary General. The fact that Carrington had previously exercised these significant "military" functions could only impress the participants of the conference for a very short while. It soon became clear that his diplomacy was not backed by what turned out to be essential for the resolution of the Yugoslav conflict - a credible threat of the use of force. So, the flames of war started burning, and it would take quite a while for the fire to be extinguished. The assessment that modern wars in Europe last between three to four years proved to be true. The attempts of the Community to prevent the tragedy with diplomatic means proved futile. The behavior of the main protagonists of the crisis, the leaderships of the most influential Yugoslav federal units, was bellicose at the negotiating table. When it became clear that the ministers of foreign affairs of the republics were not capable of producing peace, the presidents were summoned to join the table. When this proved to be insufficient, the entire Presidency of the SFRY was called. Finally, the London International Conference was summoned to which many relevant players of world politics were invited. However, all these numerous international efforts did not produce peace. Whether there was to be war or peace on the territory of each republic and with its neighbors depended not on the number and the composition of international conferences, but on the republics’ the domestic and the foreign policy behavior.

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Macedonia and the crisis

In the political turmoil that engulfed the Yugoslav Federation, Macedonia was guided by the principle of peaceful self-determination. Because of the absence of basic military power it was reasonable to avoid fight among the ethnic groups, as well as with the Yugoslav Army that was under Serbian domination. However, in an atmosphere of heated feelings, reason seldom functions successfully with the majority. There lied the personal risks of the advocates of the principle of peaceful self-determination. Namely, one could not find fault in the voiced argument that nobody in Balkan history has ever achieved independence without bloodshed and that the historical chance for accomplishing it, with arms if necessary, should not be missed.

The only counter-argument was that we live in a different Europe in which nations can accomplish independence with peaceful means. It was an argument that its few advocates could not guarantee to be indisputable. Nevertheless, to insist on the course of a peaceful separation contrary to the militant calls of certain political circles meant, if nothing else, postponement of war. A postponed war, to paraphrase Churchill, could be an evaded war. Fortunately, it turned out to be so.

Of course, the same position of non-use of violence had to be held in domestic politics as well, especially when following the example of all ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, the Albanians in Macedonia organized a referendum for autonomy, the so-called Ilirida. In this case also, a delayed war on something that at the time looked like an open call for secession, became an evaded war. Going back to international relations, we must state that radicals, that is, people who are really or allegedly ready immediately to die for their state, play an important role in security of every country. Namely, they are a strong factor of deterrence towards foreign plans for military intervention. There is some truth to the claim that it is madness to behave reasonably among fools. Fortunately, the political pendulum in Macedonia did not abruptly dash to the other extreme - to aggressive nationalism, as was the case with the other Yugoslav republics. It temporarily stopped in the middle. Namely, in the political quake that occurred a decade ago, power fell from the "dogmatic" into the hands of the "liberal" wing of the then League of the Communists, only to fall into the hands of the nationalists eight years later.

However, by that time the nationalists were no longer the same persons. Essentially changed international and domestic conditions (Macedonia managed to accomplish independence in a peaceful way) changed the leaders of the nationalistic parties as well. Most of them experienced even a visual transformation with properly cut hairs and beards… It seems as if the absence of revolution spared Macedonia from the uncertainties it brings. It also spared Macedonia from the repetition of the bloody scenarios of the other parts of the former Federation. For irony to be bigger, history made a joke with the political representatives of Macedonia. Those who believed that the fall of the one-party dictatorship was to be followed by democracy, integration, and social and economic issues, were placed in a position to fight for statehood; those who were ardent advocates of the national state are struggling with democracy, integration, social, and economic issues today.

The moderate, evolutionary way of political change in domestic politics was reflected on the international plan as well and not without misunderstandings. In the Hague negotiations, apart from the Slovenian and the Serbian positions, the Macedonian position was also present. This caused some misunderstanding with both parties, since each of them wanted Macedonia to support their view. It took a while for them to realize that what to them looked as something "in-between" was, in fact, a legitimate third position. Where did Macedonia's third position at the Hague negotiations originate? It originated from the awareness of the vulnerability of Macedonia in case the Serbian, Slovenian or Croatian approach was accepted for, led by the principle "everyone for himself," they brought chaos and intolerance in the negotiating process. Of this chaos, only the stronger could profit. So, our state interest, as the Macedonian diplomacy interpreted it, dictated that the process of dissolution be accomplished in a peaceful, gradual and, above all, organized way. This is why we insisted on an overall resolution of the "Yugoslav problem" at the conference table. This approach was interpreted by some domestic politicians as (intentional!?) slowing down of the process of independence and as an action against Macedonia and in favor of preserving Yugoslavia.

However, in spite of all international efforts to avoid the worst - war - this was not accomplished. In relations among states, as in relations among individuals, there is a limit as to how far one can go in helping the other. Thus, if a state or an individual decides to commit suicide, there is little one can do. The collective trance in which the Yugoslav people, instigated by their political leaderships, found themselves, could not lead to anything good. On the other hand, the possibilities for the "international community" to resolve the crisis with the help of law and justice were subjected to numerous restrictions. Thus, the legal approach of the European Community was under constant pressures of the political processes inside the Community. The notion that Carrington and Badantere could indefinitely work according to the principles of law and justice did not resist the pressure of European politics.

The best illustration for the conflict between law and politics is the conclusion of Badantere's Arbitration Commission composed of presidents of constitutional courts of several EU member countries. In analyzing our responses to the presented questionnaires and in evaluating our international position from a legal aspect, the Commission concluded that Macedonia and Slovenia were the only two republics that fulfilled the criteria for independence. The political processes in the international community were pointing to another direction. Namely, led by its regional ambitions, Germany recognized Slovenia and Croatia, thus causing waves of recognition from other countries. Excluding itself from the resolution of the problems of the Yugoslav Federation and leaving this process to the European states, the United States made it possible for the strongest - Germany - unimpeded to demonstrate its political will. Only later, in the process of bloody disintegration of the unfortunate federation, did the United States enter the political game, and a new hierarchy of power was established, with the domination of America. On the other hand, the fact that Greece, an EU member, found itself in the situation of arbiter in a conflict in which it was a side, showed that not only could it not be neutral, but that also the other members of the Union, volence-nolence, supported its position. Namely, the basic goal of every alliance of states is to protect the interests of its members. The clause denoting that they have to demonstrate solidarity with their partner whenever its national interest is endangered is, more or less, obligatory. A national interest is whatever a state names it as its national interest, regardless of how the other members of the alliance see it. Thus, although the European partners did not approve of Greece's attitude towards the Republic of Macedonia, they stood behind their partner.

The lesson learnt from this experience is that in international relations politics dominates over law. Legal norms are means of communication among states and rarely more than that. The attempts of the weaker countries to create political equality among states, which unfortunately does not exist in real life, with the help of law, are often doomed to failure. The influence of one state over another, through pressure to produce the desired behavior, signifies implementation of power, and this is the essence of politics. Thus, the attempt to neutralize power in such a way as to declare political pressure of one state over another illegal, is an attempt to eliminate politics. As there is no way to eliminate neither the differences among members of the international society nor the consequences that these differences produce in every day life, politics cannot be abolished with the help of law. The attempt to abolish politics with the help of law is equal to the attempt to ban reality. In reality, as is shown by de Mesquita, who, analyzing conflicts in the world in the last 200 years, discovered that in 86 percent of the conflicts among the states, law is on the side of the stronger.

Regardless of how unpleasant these facts of life are, they must be understood, and in that context the behavior of the countries of the European Community. For truth’s sake, Macedonia received the support of the international society for its policy of peaceful self-determination and it achieved independence with peaceful means. To a great extent, the countries that make the present system of states agreed to accept Macedonia in their ranks thus making this possible. Nevertheless, Macedonia did not get everything it was entitled to according to law. For instance, it did not win the support of everyone in the conflict with Greece over its name. Only in an imaginary international system in which there is no politics but only law, can one expect everything to proceed according to law. In the real system of states, power, that is, the capability to force someone to do what he otherwise would not do, and which is manifested in the form of force, persuasion, authority, violence, or manipulation, gains in importance whenever the country cannot legally fulfill its "vital" interests. Greece's greater power in relation to Macedonia, as well as its position in EU and NATO, are the factors that impeded and still impede the solution of the problem in our favor. These are the same factors that will most probably resolve the problem in favor of the stronger side, unless, of course, Greece withdraws from the dispute. But in order for this to happen there must be very strong reasons. Such a reason could be, for example, Macedonia's "dangerous" rapprochement with Bulgaria, their potential regional rival, and it's aim would be affirmation of the distinct Macedonian national identity, the way the Greeks see it.

Suffice to mention, the importance for Macedonia that this problem be resolved stems from the fact that it can not achieve membership in neither the EU nor NATO, our strategic goals, without the consent of the Greek parliament. Hopes, in Macedonian public opinion, that the United Nations is the place where the struggle for the name will be definitely won, turned out to be unreal. They rested on the conviction that this organization, together with the International Court of Justice, probably the most prestigious international institution, must act in conformity with the law promoted in their documents. But, speaking of the world organization, the United Nations is not a court but a political institution. This means that interests of 189 member states are present in its Assembly. Decision making is an interest adaptation process in which the formally equal, but in fact, according to their power, unequal states promote their national or state interests without too much concern for the interests of others. In promoting their national interests, the states rely on their power and thus the decision making process of the Organization is a competition for power or, let us use one of its apparent forms - influence. The confusion comes as a result of the fact that the growth of international legislation, the product of an interdependent world in which interests of states often coincide, is often interpreted as the end of the domination of power politics. Power politics is still dominant although in this world of growing interdependence at least one of its forms - naked force, is in decline. However, having in mind the latest example of Kosovo, it too should not be excluded.

It might sound strange, but in the international judiciary process politics also dominates over law. The reason being that in this domain, states also try to reserve for themselves as large a freedom of action as possible. Only in rare situations do they agree to go to court, in spite of the fact that this organization, the International Court of Justice, is said to be of the highest reputation and, probably, the best designed international institution. There is, in fact, fear that politics will substitute impartial trial. From this justified fear stems the distinction between legal and political cases, referring to cases that states are ready to take to court and those that they are not. The former are disputes between parties concerning their rights and duties, while the latter are described with general formulations like "everything that is in the exclusive authority of a sovereign state," or "everything that refers to the vital interests of a sovereign state." So, states can always evade the International Court of Justice by proclaiming the dispute political. It is interesting that practically all the countries insist on freedom to choose their own instruments for resolving conflicts and are opposed to "compulsory jurisdiction." Among the reasons for states taking this position is fear that in the final verdict influence of the country and not justice will triumph. The UN Secretary General affirmed this position by saying in 1995 that he "understood" why states opted for a political solution for their disputes even when a legal issue was at stake! Part of the argument why states refuse to take their disputes to the International Court lies in the fact that cases are judged according to a voluminous corpus of international norms. This undoubtedly implies an interpretation of these norms on the side of the judges, which means that the Court participates in the creation of these norms. This is the reason for the fear that whatever the Court "creates" may be at the detriment of one of the sides, since in the "creation" process the Court is exposed to pressures and influences. All this confirms the commonly accepted, though paradoxical, thesis that respect for International Law and acceptance of juridical methods for the resolution of disputes, is a political decision!

Only the eyes of a "juridical idealist" still see the United Nations as a supranational organization that creates and imposes compulsory norms for its' members. In fact, the United Nations is a political organization and the power of each individual state is projected in the decisions of the organization. Here is an example from personal diplomatic experience that can serve as a good illustration of the role of politics and power in the United Nations. During the election of the last Secretary General, US power or, if you wish, US influence was challenged. Namely, this UN member country believed that one mandate was enough for the then Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali. There were several reasons for the American position, but most important was this country's dissatisfaction with the course and the tempo of UN reforms and the wish to see a more dynamic Secretary General. The United States also called on Ghali's publicly given statement that due to his age he would not seek another five-year mandate. However, Ghali changed his mind and due to the good reputation he enjoyed among the member-states, which originated from his personal qualities as well as from the position of Secretary General, he managed to provide a huge support for his re-election. The support was such that at the first casting of the votes in the Security Council Ghali got 14 out of the possible 15 votes. Normally, the missing vote was the one of the United States, which led to a series of votings, which is in conformity with the right of each permanent member of the Security Council to veto a decision. The voting process was repeated several times, while in the meantime the active U.S. diplomatic machinery was accelerated and empowered in the United Nations as well as throughout the world. At the end of this process of convincing, Boutros-Boutros Ghali lost 15 to 0!

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About the politician - a person who promoting his personal interests, promotes the interests of the state

The politician is a person who, by promoting his personal, promotes the broader social interest. This contradiction, together with the one that emerges from the specific relation - domestic society-international society, defines the behavior of every politician in the world. By following his own interest, or as the old masters of political thought would say by following his own wish for profit, power and (or) glory, the politician is doing his best to seize power and to stay in power as long as possible. His wish to stay in power for a long time "programs" him to think in short terms, until the next elections. As his survival depends on the votes of the citizens, he is also "programmed" not to initiate issues that are unpopular and that might cost him the loss of his position. The contradiction on which international society is founded - sovereign, but also under international law- is, also, reflected in the attitude of the politician. Namely, international society is probably the only society in which its members insist on full independence. It is a truism that the interest for the survival of the state has a priority over the survival of the international society or that peoples are emotionally attached to their national communities, but not to an abstraction called international community. International Law, on the other hand, is a reflection of these values. Thus, what is understood as common interest that produces compulsory decisions for its members, within domestic society, either does not exist or is in its' most rudimentary form in international society. The horizontal basis of this structure called international society implies that power is diluted among its members. With patriotism as one of the basic virtues, which is often manifested in its most irrational form - "my country, right or wrong", in their relations with the outer world the state becomes a goal for itself. Or, according to the words of Jeremy Bentham (1747 - 1832): "We are always right, without the possibility of being otherwise. If we are right by court decisions that are valid for two individuals, then we are right by the rules of law; if not, then we are right by the laws of patriotism, a virtue more respected than justice." Here lies the historically confirmed knowledge that people, not to mention politicians, who dare speak of some other and not of their own state's interests risk to draw their state's anger upon themselves and be pushed aside. When, on the other hand, a dispute between two states arises, a situation when it is extremely important to understand the "other side" in order to avoid conflict, the politician who wants to deserve the applause of his own country, refuses to succumb to foreign pressures. "The more arrogant the refusal, the louder the applause," someone has written. This is quite normal since an international electoral body does not exist, and the fate of the politician is in the hands of the domestic electorate. Aware that in politics emotions dominate over reason, the politician rides the emotional waves of the population as long as they will carry him. The length is measured by years in office. Thus, when national requests collide with the interests of a foreign country or a group of countries, the politician does not hesitate to choose the former. Moreover, a process of bidding among competing political groups in a state starts, and at the end of this process is the maximalist political option, that receives the largest support at home. And it is the fierceness with which the politician fights for his "national right" is what gathers votes. The fierceness of his approach and not necessarily the ultimate outcome! Bentham captured, in one sentence, this behavior of the politician, when he wrote that in the history of England "many ministers were punished for signing peace, but none for inciting war."

Elements of these general observations about the attitude of the politician in domestic and international politics found their confirmation in the Greek-Macedonian dispute, which emerged with the independence of the Republic of Macedonia. Normally, the same elements are present in the Greek politics as well. The spiral of misunderstanding began with the conditions set by Greece in regard to the name and the Constitution, and some time later, to the flag. In the history of inter-state disputes such deeply emotional topics that encroach on the honor of the nation are the most difficult to resolve. At a certain point in 1991 one and a half million people took to the streets of Athens and Thessaloniki under the slogan "Macedonia is Greek". Together with the violations of the air space of the Republic of Macedonia by Greek planes, the problems with the transit of people and goods through Greek territory and the periodical embargoes, were signals for a possible war. Totally disarmed with the departure of the Yugoslav Peoples Army, Macedonia, realistically speaking, had no alternative but to seek a peaceful resolution of the imposed dispute. The problem is that when emotions of nations are affected, few politicians, on both sides, dare look at the problem realistically. To complicate things even further, there was the awareness that Macedonia could not (and still cannot) become a member of the EU and NATO, the guarantors of our security and wellbeing, without the resolution of the dispute with a member country of these international organizations. Guided by these facts of life, Macedonian diplomacy, a fledging institution, insisted on meetings with everybody who was willing to help to the solution of our problems, most of all with Greek politicians and diplomats. However, the official representatives of Greece were inaccessible. The parties' calculations for staying in or seizing power dependent on the applause of the nationally enflamed Greek electorate that obliged politicians to strain the relations with the new state and to refuse direct contacts with its representatives. Among those who instigated the process of bellicose outbidding was the then Greek Foreign Minister, someone who was by function is supposed to be committed to peaceful resolution of disputes. The nationalistic syndrome that, as history teaches us, often leads to war, affected many aspects of Greek social and political life. However, international pressure, primarily from the United States and the European Union, together with the growing awareness in Greece that war is not a solution, led to a gradual calming down of emotions.

The problem with Greece was one of the most difficult problems facing the diplomacy of the fledging state - the Republic of Macedonia. State interests, in the core of which are always the security and the wellbeing of its citizens, demanded a speedy resolution of all the problems with this EU and NATO member country. Personal interests of politicians, members of the bureaucracy and experts, on the other hand, demanded the opposite - endless negotiations and postponement of an extremely unpopular solution, because such a solution could have cost them their positions and, normally, the accompanying privileges. They were all aware that the Greek veto was hampering the vital process of our integration into EU and NATO. They were well aware that the international recognition of the state itself was slowed down. It was no secret in the UN that the instructions from Athens to Greek diplomats in the world as regards the achievements of their Macedonian counterparts were: "What they do, you undo!" On the other hand, the Macedonian society's ability for compromise on the main issue was not greater than the one of the Greek's. The pride of the Macedonians who had recently declared independence made them extremely sensitive to the dictate of their neighbor. The pride also had its roots in the fierce spirit of independence of these former "Yugoslavs," victors in the Second World War, that was born in the resistance against all foreign pressures in the last five decades, including the historical "No!" to Stalin. These facts of life were not in favor of moderateness and willingness to compromise. However, before the moment it became clear that Macedonia was to become a member of the United Nations, it looked like politics kept the door open for a possible compromise. This Macedonian position had the full support of the EU and the United States. As a matter of fact, this policy was the best for the security and economic interests of the Republic of Macedonia, since it avoided direct collision that could end up with a war among unequals. Normally, compromise was only possible after the formula from Lisbon, which insisted on deleting the wordMacedonia from our country's name, had been abandoned by the EU. However, the moment it became clear that the Republic of Macedonia was to become a UN member without resolving the dispute to our advantage, since Greece simply transferred the problem and its influence to the UN, there was turmoil on the domestic political scene. These dramatic moments for Macedonia, called for a joint effort on the side of government and opposition. In the interest of the nation's security and wellbeing government and opposition had to share the responsibility for the difficult decisions that lay ahead. Instead, everyone behaved according to the a shared political reflex. How to remain in power or how to seize power was the basic question for all the actors that made up the political spectrum of Macedonia. Those in power had already decided to bring international recognition to the state by themselves, without anybody's assistance, and thus deserve the whole glory. The opposition, on the other hand, tried toscore as many political points as possible from unavoidable fact that the state's admission to the UN would be under the "shameful name" Former…. The political establishment in its totality was just a step away from the political assessment that it was possible to remain in power only if one stood "firmly" in defense of the "constitutional name," or that power could be seized only if the constitutional name was even "more firmly" supported. There was no more space for compromise. The political bidding that started, soon ended in the maximalist position - we are not surrendering our constitutional name! The perspectives for the wellbeing and security of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia were in collision with those of the politicians. Not a single relevant political factor voiced his support in favor of an unpopular solution, that many considered an act of political suicide. The interests of the politicians prevailed. However, the offer for Macedonia to enter the World Organization and the chance for the state to finally find its place on the political map of the world could not be missed because it was in the interest of the politicians as well. This is how a paradoxical situation came about: not a single relevant political factor in the state accepted the reference by which the big powers, under Greek pressure, decided to admit us to the UN, and yet no one opposed this admission. Just in case, the highest state officials expressed their disagreement and even put it in writing. And yet, they took their seat in the General Assembly. The opposition, on the other hand, in its zeal to discredit those in power, so as to order to take their places, expressed its total disagreement, in continuity. The result from this disunity was a year and half economic embargo, with its' tremendous cost on Macedonia's economy, and the retarding of the process of integration to the EU and NATO, so evident today. The people paid the bill. However, the people should not be idealized. At my remark, as foreign minister, that the confrontation with Greece would impoverish the people and thus distance us from our strategic goal - membership in the EU and NATO, I got a lecturing response from a person who made a career in the service of the state. Those same people, he remarked, will hang you if a compromise over the name is made. He then concluded that only after the people have paid the economic price of their heated feelings and demand a solution, the politician comes onto the scene.

How to reconcile the rational moves of a good foreign policy with the emotional requests of the public opinion, in a system of democracy where the easiest way for acquiring political support is to fulfill the wishes of the masses? This dilemma is characteristic of any politics, particularly of the foreign policy of a weak country that cannot count on victory, but on a compromise at the most. There is no easy solution. The politician will either remain a politician and look after of his own skin or push himself to the level of a statesman, refusing to be a slave of public opinion and becoming its leader. One does not have particularly to dwell on all the unpleasant things that inevitably accompany such a stance, some of which could cost the statesman his life.

The absence of state tradition and experience with the bigger part of the political establishment in Macedonia made people dought or openly disagree with the diplomatic moves of the Republic of Macedonia in the first years following the proclamation of independence. As a matter of fact, there was a lack of awareness, as Morgenthau writes, that "diplomacy ends in war fails its basic mission: to promote national interest by peaceful means." Out of the three means at the disposal of every democracy - persuasion, compromise, and the threat of the use of force - Macedonia lacked the last. Perhaps the most important, because as the famous Prussian ruler Freidrich the Great said, diplomacy without an army is music without instruments. So, Macedonian diplomacy was to produce music by whistling and singing, and did this quite well. But, it was constantly criticized, by the opposition and even from members of the Government, for being a "frightened" foreign policy. While, in normal countries everyone is aware that armed forces are an instrument of war and foreign policy an instrument of peace, some people in Macedonia compensated the absence of the first by pressuring diplomacy to be bellicose. "To bang the fist on the table," I believe, was the favorite phrase the critics used, and a while later it was - "To stand firmly as a rock." As far as the first remark is concerned, it is advisable to recall the recipe for a successful foreign policy given by Theodore Roosevelt: "Speak softly and hold a big stick in your hand." As regards the second, there is no such thing as a "stony diplomacy". Namely, while the role of the army is to crush and defeat the enemy and to think in categories of absolute victory or defeat, the diplomatic mind must make different deliberations. Although the goal of both army and diplomacy is to promote the national interest of the state, they do this in different ways. Namely, the role of diplomacy is not to destroy the chances for a peaceful resolution of the dispute and to evade war by making compromises when necessary.

Macedonian, like any other diplomacy in the world, must formulate the goals of its foreign policy, so that they are in conformity with the power that it has for their fulfillment. It must, also, understand the goals other states and the power that they possess to realize them. Furthermore, it must define the degree of difference and compatibility between "domestic" and "international" goals and, finally, apply adequate means for the fulfillment of these goals. As Morgenthau remarks "if any of these tasks are not fulfilled, the success of the foreign policy will be endangered." Analyzing the states by their power, we distinguish three types: big powers, that conduct global world politics, regional powers, that project their influence in the region in which they are located, and small states, whose aim is to survive. Foreign policies of all these countries must take into consideration the power factor and accordingly formulate their foreign policy goals. In the formulation of its foreign policy today, the Republic of Macedonia must take into consideration the interdependence between the internal processes in the Balkan states, their mutual relations, and the relations between the Balkan states and the big powers. In doing this, a clear distinction should be made between the period before and after NATO's military.

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Revisionist forces and the status quo forces in the Balkans

History teaches that ethnic conflict is the main source of antagonisms and wars in the Balkans. The same historical experience indicates that, as a rule, inter-state discords are not resolved by agreements between the sides involved and that force is the ultimate arbiter. Stories of peaceful exchange of population, about plebiscite or about Balkan federations, have ended in the horror of wars. Namely, outcomes have always depended on the military might of the sides in conflict, as well as the might of the involved foreign powers. Peace in the last 50 years was the result of the occupation of South-East Europe by the Soviet Union and of its ability and willingness to intervene with force in case an East European or Balkan state decided to attack a neighbor. The breakdown of the eastern bloc and the withdrawal of Russian power within its national boundaries, as well as the dissolution of Yugoslavia, left a vacuum that was filled with chaos and wars in some parts of former Yugoslavia. As if old ethnic animosities and territorial aspirations were de-frozen, and the "classical Balkan scheme", was reestablished.

Ethnic conflicts in the Balkans are also the result of the fact that state borders are do not follow ethnic lines, but cut across them. Thus, every Balkan state has "its own" minorities in some of the neighboring countries and the stage is set for debates or conflict about the position of "one's own" minority and the how just the borders are. The fact that every single Balkan ethnic group will, rightly, say that "history" has not done them wrong, makes contemporary Balkan states pliant to malignant nationalism that draws its hate from the depths of history. Sharing the same ethnic group between two states, in which it is a minority in one and a majority in the other, lays the ground for territorial claims and change of borders. The phenomenon called irredentism, manifesting itself as a tendency towards revision of the borders, with the aim of incorporating the ethnic minority and the territory of the neighboring country, exploded dramatically when Serbia and Croatia, the two strongest federal units of Yugoslavia, opted for this policy. Albanian irredentism from the 70s and the 80s, on the other hand, weakened when the political system of Albania collapsed and when its government came under the influence of the West, the powerful alliance of status quo, which does not approve of revisionist international attitude. The two forces of irredentism in the Balkans, Serbia and Croatia, in the attempt to incorporate "their" minorities and the territory they lived on, encroached on the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A natural ally of any of the two states would have been a country that was also trying to "correct" the international borders in its favor. Of the remaining four republics that made the Yugoslav Federation (Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovenia), only Macedonia had the "historical" potential to become anirredentist state. However, the lack of military power and a foreign policy that renounced "historical" aspirations for a Greater Macedonia at the very beginning of the 90' made the new state unsuitable as a partner for irredentism. Declaring itself against the revision of borders and for European integration, on the other hand, made the Republic of Macedonia very suitable for cooperation with the EU and the United States. Greece and Bulgaria were the other two states with possible irredentist aspirations. A very suitable partner for Serbia could have been Greece, its traditional ally, had its status quo policy been abandoned in favor of a revisionist one. Symptoms that indicated that a military intervention could be in the making were numerous. There were slogans about the Greekness of Macedonia in the hands of millions of people marching in the streets of Athens and Thessaloniki. A nationalist was at the head of Greek diplomacy. There were frequent violations of the new country's air space and an economic blockade was imposed on it... There was yet another event that indicated that these symptoms were not harmless and that Greece could have easily found an ally for revising Balkan borders at a time when the crisis was escalating in the region. During a working lunch in Brussels, covering his mouth with a napkin, a high-ranking EU representative whispered to me while turning his eyes to Milosevic, sitting across the table, that he (Milosevic) had offered Greece a mutual division of Macedonia. It is very probable that such an offer had been made, in one way or another, since, when going to war, it is always helps to have an ally who shares your goals. However, it is absolutely sure that when Greece's Prime Minister had revealed the Serbian offer to his European partners, and that he had to do because of his country's vital interest to remain a member of the EU, he did not get the necessary support for such an adventure. So far as Bulgaria is concerned, history teaches that this state and its people paid a very high price for its irredentist policy towards Macedonia. With its political system in transition and with economic misery at its doorstep, Bulgaria chose a policy of integration in European and Atlantic structures, thus opting for a status quo policy in the Balkans. Placing its historical irredentism under control, it was satisfied that, at least, Macedonia was out of Serbian control. Albania, with its economic and political systems in a state of collapse, in order to survive, had to ask for immediate help from the West and to agree to follow its lead in Balkan affairs, thus opting for a policy of status quo.

The behavior of the majority of the Balkan states leads to the conclusion that their politics was strongly influenced by the European currents of integration. So, if one can not say that these currents eliminated irredentist policies with the Balkan states at the end of the 20^th century, they significantly softened them. Namely, of all the states in the Balkans, only two declared irredentism as a base of their foreign policy: Serbia and Croatia. All the other states, some sooner others later, some by their own will others under outside pressure, chose the "European option" that implies respect for territorial status quo and for European integration. In the case of Yugoslavia, Serbian-Croatian irredentism was the driving force behind the violent disintegration of the Federation. Refusal to accept the administrative borders of the federal units as the new inter-state borders and the wars that followed were products of these countries' irredentist policies. The anger of the world public opinion was directed against Serbia and its policy. Croatia, a country with identical irredentist claims, was often spared criticism because Tudjman, in doing whatever Serbia did, simply moved one step behind Milosevic. With the change of government and the death of Tudjman, Croatia renounced the policy of irredentism, leaving Serbia its' sole representative.

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The Albanian ethnic group in Macedonia - conflict and accommodation

Speaking about the attitude of an ethnic minority in response to the factual or latent irredentist claims by a neighboring country in which the majority is of the same ethnic origin, theory discerns three situations: 1. The minority accepts the existing borders and makes efforts to promote its position inside the state, thus, working on the improvement of relations between the state in which the minority lives and the neighboring state in which the members of its ethnic group are the majority population; 2. The minority works towards unification with its relatives on the other side of the border and expresses support for the policy of irredentism; 3. If one ethnic group is the minority in two neighboring countries, they work towards the unification in a common state.

This theoretical scheme may help us explain the attitude of the Albanian minority in Macedonia and of the Albanian state in the past ten years. The first two situations are relevant for our case. The meetings with the diplomatic representatives from Albania in the period 1991-1993 indicate that they regularly expressed their concern for the status of the Albanian ethnic minority. The theoretical model says that the first step of a policy of irredentism is the expression of concern for the ethnic minority in a neighboring country. However, if this is so, then nobody in the Balkans, the Macedonians including, is immune to dreams of greater states. Paradoxically, one of the issues on which the Romanian Foreign Minister insisted while passing through Skopje in those years, was the position of the Vllach minority in Macedonia and a meeting with the representatives of their organization. So, at least measured by Balkan standards, the expression of concern for “one's ethnic minority” cannot be considered a policy of open, but rather latent, irredentism.

At a meeting with the Albanian Foreign Minister in Skopje, the first topic on his agenda was the position of the Albanians in Macedonia. Responding to his question about their position, I suggest that our two countries establish a telephone line, so that the people may call each other and ask how they were. Namely, at that time, ten years ago, the only telephone communication between neighboring Macedonia and Albania was via Athens or Rome! Not to mention the conditions of roads and border crossings or the non-existent air traffic. However, in a region like the Balkans, with a strong tradition of undefined loyalties, suspicions about the "real" intentions of the other ethnic group or a neighboring country can easily lead to a conflict.

Nevertheless, it is a fact that with the exception of Serbia and Croatia, not a single Balkan state openly demanded revision of borders. What is even more important, none actively worked towards this aim because if, for instance, Albania was to ask for a revision of the state border with Macedonia, part of the Albanian population in Macedonia might express support for the idea for national unity. However, the quickest way for Albania to turn the other states of the Balkan against itself would be to require border revision. The lack of support for such a project among the big powers and the weakness of the Albanian State are not in favor of irredentism either. Parallel to this policy of the Albanian state is the behaviorof the Albanian political parties in Macedonia that express their support for preserving the territorial integrity of Macedonia and in favor of improving their status in the frame of a common state. Nevertheless, as in the case with other ethnically divided societies in the world where ethnic groups demand greater autonomy or some sort of a federal solution, in Macedonia also this aim is expressed in the formula constitutional nation. This formula, present in the programs of the two most important Albanian parties, leaves the question of the status of the Albanian minority in the Republic of Macedonia open. This is a maximalist formula which implies that Macedonia is a national state of two nations - the Albanian and the Macedonian. In fact, the Albanians expressed their disagreement with the status of their ethnic group in Macedonia back in 1991, when the first Constitution of the state was adopted, by refusing to vote in parliament. The fact that at the end of the process of accommodation of positions among political groups represented in Parliament there was no consensus on a text that could be acceptable for the most numerous ethnic minority, illustrates that the constitutional project was, at least partially, unsuccessful. The compromise that was achieved, though, was the one between the "civil" and the "national" political option in the Macedonian bloc. Namely, while the first preferred a "technical," nationally not colored Constitution, the second insisted on emphasizing the national character of the state. The compromise produced a Constitution in which the preamble is "nationally colored," while the text of the Constitution in itself is a neutral charter on the rights and duties of citizens. However, the fact remains that an agreement was not reached with the most numerous minority (which refuses to see itself as a minority), and that of utmost importance for the stability of every political community in the Balkans is that such an agreement is reached. The lack of such an agreement shows that, speaking of the first constitution, the political process of "equilibrating of interests and balancing of groups" (Bentley) at the end of which is the constitutional norm, was not successful in Macedonia.

A major dilemma among analysts of politics in the world can be formulated as follows - What is of decisive importance for the stability of the state: the legal or the political process? It is a tradition in the Balkans that those who have power experience it as an instrument for creating reality, a kind of a machine for imposing the Constitution and the laws on the population. A version of this approach in contemporary democratic conditions is the understanding that all that is necessary to proclaim a political concept valid, is for the majority to support the project. The majority in the Republic of Macedonia is in favor of the concept of a "civil state," meaning a state in which it is not important which ethnic group you belong to, but whether you enjoy all the democratic rights and freedoms of a citizen. Thus, the Constitution expresses the will of the greater majority that support the "civil concept", even though the Constitution also states that Macedonia is the national state of the Macedonians. One can not find fault with the "civil concept". From an abstract point of view, one can say that it is the best concept. The only problem is that the largest ethnic minority group in Macedonia does not accept it. We could even say that the members of the Albanian ethnic group in Macedonia are not able to raise themselves to the level of a progressive political concept, the one of the civil society. However, in saying so, we find ourselves just a step away from the cynical conclusion that since the concept is good, and reality is not, too bad forreality! This view can be dangerous for the stability of any democratic society, including the Macedonian, since social peace can only be maintained through a process of accommodation of interests. The attempt to put these processes under control (even a constitutional one) when political solutions do not reflect the wishes of significant parts of the population, leads to tensions. The political concept that was promoted by the previous government was based on such, theoretically looking, excellent ideas, but it ended in a series of dangerous inter-ethnic explosions in which people were killed. It is wrong to believe that the continuation of the same policy, that would no deviate from the Constitution and the laws for even a millimeter, would have produce stability in the end. This has clearly been demonstrated in the examples of other countries. When basic conflicts in a society (and the inter-ethnic conflict is such a basic conflict in Macedonia) go beyond the politicians' power and ability to channel it into a peaceful accommodation, a civil war is possible.

The exhausted power for peaceful accommodation in the 1998 elections produced a new, nationally more radical, coalition. Namely, both sides, that is the Macedonian and the Albanian, insist on their national identity and do not have particular understanding for the "civil" concept. But how radicals cooperate? Contrary to expectations, this coalition produced peace and cooperation on the inter-ethnic level. In fact, a political process of power sharing produced stability, something the Constitution and the laws could not. This is yet another proof that in a democratic pluralistic society, meaning a society in which groups are freely compete, politics not legal norms has a priority in preventing violence. Under the pressure of domestic as well as international conditions, awareness will slowly start growing in Macedonia about the real nature of governing as an art of accommodation - a political process in which the government negotiates with the leaders of the discontent social groups, not throw them in jail. The lesson that had to be learnt fast was that in democratic societies, as Macedonia aspires to become, the demands of the smaller associations in the state must not be ignored and the leaders of those groups must not be treated as persons that present only themselves and nobody else. In other words, the lesson learnt in all pluralist societies is that repression against significant collectivities ready to defend their interests (the way they understand them) that are contrary to the interests of the central authority, are rarely successful. If this lesson is true and if preserving the stability of the political order in a state means avoidance of civil war (and not victory in a civil war), then accommodation of relations among numerous groups in society is a necessity. The alternative called civil war is always open, as demonstrated in a range of cases in the former Yugoslav republics where central authorities did not manage to establish order via political accommodation. Accommodation, as a matter of fact, is the foundation of every successful political process in a plural society. It is easy to declare the rule of law in the relations among groups in a society via an all-powerful center of authority capable of breaking the resistance of all those who break legal norms. It is far more difficult for the state to become the center of a process of accommodation. Serious civil unrest cannot be avoided with the help of the police and courts, but in accommodation between social groups, through an open process of resolving differences before they reach the emotional level that explodes into violence. So, in the complex Balkan circumstances, if they want peace and not war, politicians must become statesmen. They must be individuals who, with the help of political intelligence, prevent such situations, preserving domestic stability through an open process of, as Neimeyer says "constant accommodation, compensation, reconciliation, and balancing". The "legal machinery helps keep stability that has been reached in this way, but it is not in itself the basic condition for peace," since "prevention of war, as well as prevention of revolution in the state, does not depend on the legal procedure, but on the art of accommodation." Thus, the reason why in developed pluralistic democracies there are not wars today lies in the good functioning of the political process that is capable of producing compromises and promoting accommodation.

The preparations for the legalization of the Tetovo university speak of the fact that the process of accommodation in Macedonia will be carried out independently of the constitutional concept that promotes the "civil option" ("civil" as regards the Albanians, but "civil and national" as regards the Macedonians). Namely, if the English proverb that "Constitution is what you have in real life" is true, Macedonia will have to produce political solutions in relation to its minorities that will reflect this reality. Reality is that close to 30 percent of the population is of Albanian ethnic origin, with a tendency of a rapid growth. Avoidance of serious ethnic conflicts in the future will be possible only through political solutions that will attract the loyalty of the Albanians to the state of Macedonia. In other words, it is necessary to follow a process of accommodation so that ethnic Albanians become political Macedonians. The cultural and economic emancipation of the ordinary Albanian man and woman, as well as in opening economic perspectives for the Macedonians not to emigrate, is a way of reaching that goal. Is this enough for Albanians to become political Macedonians? A re-evaluation of the "civil" concept will have to be made. The "civil" concept (according to which it does not matter which ethnic group you belong to, but whether you enjoy human rights as an individual), is a concept that does not function in Belgium and Canada, for instance, and it is hard to expect it to work in the Balkans. So, in our part of the world, or especially here, we can expect, as best-case scenario, that real processes will lead to a combination of guarantees of individual and collective rights of the major ethnic groups. Elements of consensus in the decision making on some issues as, for example, those in the sphere of education could be introduced, which would introduce collective guarantees in the political system of Macedonia. In exchange, the Albanians could accept the status of minority and work on the promotion of the Macedonian language in the Albanian system of education. Acceptance of the status of a national minority on the side of the Albanians in Macedonia would reinforce the "national" position of the Macedonian population and produce international stability of the state that would be for the benefit of all ethnic groups. These might be the contours of a, conditionally speaking, authentic Macedonian road, which is not likely to happen since Albanians will not accept the status of minority. But, another option is open.

The wave of ethnic divisions that engulfed the former Yugoslav republics in the past ten years left behind it a changed ethnic landscape. The basic characteristic of this new ethnic configuration is ethnic homogenization contrary to previous multi-culture. From Croatia, via Bosnia to Kosovo, multi-ethnicity has collapsed and "ethnically clean" political and territorial entities have been created. This has happened contrary to the wish and efforts of the international factor. So, if we look at the political map of Bosnia and Herzegovina and place the NATO military forces deployment on a transparent sheet of paper over it, we will see that the first separates ethnic communities, while the second cuts across them. The first map reflects the outcome of the ethnic wars, while the second reflects the wish of the international community to renew multi-culturalism. The idea of multi-culturalism experienced a similar defeat in Kosovo. Only the wish of the big powers not to allow the changing of borders, stands in the way of the nominally Yugoslav province not to proclaim independence or, if it wishes, unification with Albania. The idea of multi-culturalism experiences different interpretations in Macedonia as well, but one thing is sure: the "civil" will not manage to push aside the "national", thus making further accommodation of interests of the two main ethnic groups - the Macedonian and the Albanian - indespesible. Moreover, inside the Macedonian ethnic group, issues related to the "real" national identity are opened for debate, issues advocating the "Bulgarian roots" of the Macedonians. Some of the people advocating the revision of the 50-year old Macedonian "communist" history (intending to prove that Macedonian and Bulgarian histories have been one and the same for significant periods of contemporary history) hold presently the reins of power. This fact demonstrates that the process has gone a long way. The idea of common history of the Macedonians and the Bulgarians might fit well into the plans for the unification of the Albanians in one state. Then the process of division of Macedonia, goes the logic of this view, would not be carried violently, but "naturally." If the Albanian population gravitates towards Albania and the Macedonian towards Bulgaria, we would have Bosnian conditions without war in Macedonia. The ultimate outcome of this Balkan scenario that would be carried out under the guidance of the big powers and through the peaceful self-determination of the already ethnically homogenized groups, would be the creation of four greater states in the Balkans: Croatia, Serbia, Albania, and Bulgaria. However, the great danger of this scenario comes from the absence of democratic political culture with the Balkan nations, and thus an absence of respect for the will of the majority expressed in a referendum. Therefore, this scenario could very well become an overture for new wars. For a long time to come, force and not democratic forms of national expression will be defining the course of development in the Balkans. So, the best of all the bad solutions is the defense of the territorial status quo created after the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation. A long-lasting presence of foreign military troops as an impelling potential that goes far beyond the potentials of every Balkan state individually and all of them together, is essential for safe-guarding the territorial status quo. The role of a stabilizer is now on the NATO forces deployed in the Balkans. Their presence is some kind of a temporary solution to the security dilemma that makes states suspicious and nervous about military plans of their neighbors. However, it is also an "iron frame" of permitted behavior of the Balkan states that dramatically restricts their sovereignty, at least as far as decisions on war or peace are concerned. This direct military and political tutorship of the West over the Balkan states was brought about by the attitude of the local politicians who transformed the region in the past decade into a hotbed of wars and instability. Theultimate goal of this tutorship is the peaceful transform of the one-time dictatorships into democratic societies. By directing their potentials towards the construction of their economic and political systems and not wars and "ethnic cleansing," these former dictatorships have a chance to become a part of the world of democracies quicker. The interest of the West, on the other hand, is to expand this zone of democracy, peace, and stability to countries that are willing to share the values of western democracy. Nevertheless, in order to achieve this goal, foreign military presence is not sufficient. It is essential for the political vessels called Balkan states to be filled with their own democratic contents, which will be the product of their own efforts and conditions, marking the possible beginning of a process of democratic spill-over among them. Perhaps at this point "these nations…calling themselves with different names and preaching different religions" will "find the common ground for their survival - a broader, better, more rational, and more humane formula….".