Outcomes from the 17 June 2001 parliamentary elections in Bulgaria were not entirely unexpected. Nevertheless, they provoked many controversies and raised more questions than gave answers. This condition will last certainly for a long time.

The Union of Democratic Forces (or, more exactly, a coalition of the mention-ed UDF and the People's Union, another coalition between the Democratic Party and the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union of A. Moser, known as the Reunited Democratic Forces, RDF) was the first political arrangement in Bulgaria since 1990 that was successful in completing the entire 4-year long term. It came to power after the 1996-97 winter crisis with the hyperinflation, shortages of all essential items and public resentment against the Socialist government. With the introduction of the IMF-sponsored Currency Board, financial discipline was rapidly guaranteed and the Bulgarian Lev stabilized. GNP ceased to register negative values, reaching a relatively high 5% for the year 2000. Efficacious measures to improve protection of the borders, together with the introduction of contemporary travel and identification papers, led to the ability of Bulgarian citizens to travel freely in Western Europe (the so called "Schengen area"). Mainly due to political rather than economic reasons - as a reward for the staunch Bulgarian support for NATO during the Kosovo war - Bulgaria was invited to start negotiations with the EU, and quite quickly it started to comply with the standards and requirements. Within four years, Bulgaria developed from a relatively obscure country with a mainly negative image among both neighbouring and more distant countries to one respected as politically reliable and, surprisingly quickly, advancing to meet most of the economic and social criteria for affiliation with the EU and NATO. The Bulgarian Prime Minister Ivan Kostov was able to gain approval among his Western colleagues, who were eager to hear from him his evaluation not only about the situation in Bulgaria, but also about the developments in the whole region.

However, a sharp decrease in support for Prime Minister Kostov's government was mainly due to its failure to improve living standards; this overshadowed major achievements. Quite clear accomplishments in macroeconomic performance and foreign policy were way too little to convince the population that this was the right choice for a continuation in the same direction.

Firstly, the socio-economic performance of the RDF government remained poor. As a result mainly of the delayed years of restructuring of the economy, and a lack of strategic investors to buy technologically obsolete enterprises, extensive groups of workers had to be released from the idle plants and factories. Measures to create new jobs were rash and occasional, keeping the level of unemployment at the high level of 18% according to official statistics, while labour unions and other independent sources suggested one third of the work force, up to a colossal 60% and more for some particularly devastated areas and for such ethnic groups as the Roma. With the still stagnant economy, people's incomes - though relatively increased compared to the inflationary 5 -10 US Dollars as a monthly salary in 1997 - still grow disappointingly slowly, with, most recently, 100 USD representing the average monthly salary in the public sector, and even below the level of existence 40 - 50 USD pensions for the retired. The issue of corruption - which in fact was exposed by the government itself - became a strong propaganda tool against the ruling elite, when numerous false accusations were raised against leading politicians, and created an unjust image of the Kostov government as probably the most corrupt - which was, indeed, not true. Extremely rapid privatization without many interested strategic Western investors brought a lot of frustration. Among the significant failures were the Plama petrochemical conglomerate, most of the mining industry and the national carrier Balkan Airlines, which went into insolvency. Though a number of senior officials allegedly received large kickbacks in the deals, no one has yet been prosecuted. Yordan Tsonev, former chairman of the Parliament's budgetary committee, and Khristo Biserov, former UDF chief secretary, were both forced to resign over allegations of fraud, and this was all. Criminality, though statistically at a reduced level, continued to scare the population, with house robberies and the deliberate exposure in the media of brutal cases of murder and rape, including those involving minors. A general problem here was the lack of established dialogue between the government on the one hand, and the media and other opinion leaders on the other. Most of the media made a mockery of all the positive facts about the government's performance, attacked the support of Western politicians for the government as simply cheap propaganda, and created an image of Kostov as a selfish, inaccessible, corrupt and undemocratic politician - a demonstration of which was the nickname "Commander" given to Kostov.

Table 1. OFFICIAL OUTCOMES

Source: Central Election Commission, 20 June 2001.

Without any new movement, the political pendulum would most probably have gone again to the opposite, left corner, i. e., to the Socialist Party. One important contribution of these elections to the Bulgarians' voting pattern was leaving the vicious circle of choosing between the two political giants, the BSP and the RDF (see Table 2). Thus, observers commented that finally the two-poles model had left Bulgarian politics (see Table 2).

The new Parliament seemed on the one hand better educated than the previous on: there will be more than thirty university professors there, including a solid group of Sofia University Law Department professors with the Simeon coalition. There has been a significant increase - as Simeon Koburggotski himself promised - in the presence of females among the MPs, now exceeding 1/3, predominantly in the rows of the SNM.

In addition to the four coalitions that managed to enter into the 39th Bulgarian National Assembly, only three from the 40 parties and coalitions that participated in these elections achieved more than 1% of the votes. 0.37%, or some 10,000 - 15,000 votes, failed to ensure the VMRO-Gergjovden coalition passed the 4% barrier for entering the Parliament. It had an inventive and vigorous election campaign, aimed mainly at the young generations - those who are the most impatient to have better lives and thus, for that, are looking abroad. Apparently, some of the voters were deceived into voting for the false - or duplicating - "king's" coalition, the "National Movement Tsar Simeon II", which received 3.44% of the votes, and the Simeon II Coalition with 1,7% (a combination of the votes permitting an entering into the Parliament). The relatively high level of votes for both these otherwise marginal groups among the voters outside Bulgaria supports the hypothesis that a not too insignificant number of voters chose the wrong ballot paper. Two parties, which were in the parliament until now - the Euro-Left and Zhorzh Ganchev`s "one man party", garnered less than 1 per cent in Sunday`s elections - less than the Northern Alliance of Tsar Kiro (chief of a Roma clan), without any parliamentary experience. The Euro-Left won 0.99 per cent, or 44,737 votes; Zhorzh Ganchev's Bloc received 0.38 per cent, or 17,235 votes [1] . At the 1997 elections 234,058 people, or 5.5 per cent, voted Euro Left. Tsar Kiro`s party garnered 0.61 per cent, or 27,581 votes, with supporters from all constituencies. It has also to be said that the only openly anti-NATO bloc, led by the prominent writer N. Haytov, Al. Karakachanov, leader of the Green Party, and former dissident philosopher Stefan Gaytandjiev (later, both initially were part of the UDF; meanwhile, Gaytanjiev defected to the opposite camp, the Socialists, and was deeply insulted when they accepted a pro-NATO position; as for Karakachanov, after an absence of several years from political life, he entered the previous parliament with the strange conglomerate blessed by Simeon II - the National Reunion for Salvation) also scored very badly with just 0.5%. The two communist parties that took part on their own in the elections (a third party coalesced with the BSP) got together barely 20,000 votes.

Table 2. A COMPARISON OF THE OUTCOMES FROM LAST THREE ELECTIONS

These elections happened to be a test also for Bulgarian pollsters and so-ciologists' professionalism and ability to determine outcomes amidst relatively confused and rapidly changing circumstances. The political balance of power has radically changed since April, when the one-time monarch declared his intention to launch the Simeon II National Movement, SNM, and to enter the electoral race. The SNM has seen its opinion poll-rating soar almost overnight to 35 per cent. Analysts explained this unique windfall for a newcomer, not only due to its attracting undecided voters, but also large chunks of the core constituencies of the ruling RDF and the opposition Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP. Support for the ruling RDF has crumbled to around 15 per cent, and the opposition BSP was expected to take as few as 10 per cent of the vote. Analysts also said that voters would cast their ballots for Simeon out of emotion and deep disappointment in the current political elites, rather than through sound political reasoning or ideological empathy and insight. Most were predicting a period of political turbulence, lasting anything from four months to two years.

Table. 3. FORECASTS AND REALITY
(Number of seats foreseen, compared with the real outcomes)

Source: Trud daily, 20 June 2001, p. 12.

*BBSS, Mediana and Market Test assumed that VMRO-Gergjovden would pass the 4% barrier, and so, forecasts are: 1. Without VMRO-Gergjovden; 2. If VMRO-Gergjovden en-ters the Parliament.

The meteoric rise of the SNM hurt both the "mastodonts", the UDF and the BSP, but the damage it inflicted on Bulgaria's smaller parties was even more alarming. These include the Bulgarian Euro-Left and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation, which is in coalition with the St George's Day Movement. Opinion polls gave none of them much chance of winning the minimum 4 per cent of the vote required to qualify for a place in parliament. Such expectations referred also to the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, which represents interests of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, and possibly to the Moslem population in general. Turks make up to 10 per cent of the total population of Bulgaria, and in many areas they form the majority. Analysts were concerned that a failure of the Turkish minority to win any seats at all could endanger the country's fragile ethnic peace, and would further increase instability in the Balkans. As so often before, the voting pattern of the Bulgarian Turks appeared to contradict each of the proven academic rules and logic. Mass economic emigration, which led to depopulation of whole villages in Eastern Rhodopes, together with the overall economic plight of a population deprived of any of the normal living conditions, allowed sociologists to predict a reduction in the level of voting. In addition, there were reasons that could lead each other constituency to refrain from supporting "his" or "her" party: exposition of most of the MRF leaders as being informers of the communists secret police, failure of these leaders to provide any benefit for their unemployed or heavily exploited population even after they had such opportunities, as well as allegations that some of them were involved in some kind of schemes for personal enrichment at the expense of their impoverished co-nationals. It was also expected that Simeon, with his specific allure over the Turks and Roma, would "steal" a good deal of these groups' votes; this also failed to happen. Thus, none of the sociological agencies was able to predict the MRF's number of seats. Moreover, some two months before the elections, many experts even denied any presence of the Turks in the 39th National Assembly; this led some of the most impatient MRF leaders to intimidate, in view of their party's failure to enter in the parliament, with violence and revenge. In addition, the massive vote of the Bulgarian Turks residing in Turkey, that exceeded all expectations, produced a reversal in the outcomes in Dobrich region - where votes from Turkey and Central Asia were added: BSP lost an already gained seat, which passed to the MRF [2] .

Among the main vacillations was the expectation that the King's Movement would drastically increase voting activity. It was based on the fact that if, until the Simeon of Koburg Gotta declared his intention to participate, as much as 70% of the voting population was inclined to abstain, this portion would very quickly fall to a relatively insignificant value. Voting participation suddenly became prestigious. However, when the day of the election arrived, such things as the pleasant weather, pragmatic thoughts about agricultural work and the complicated procedure for voting outside the place of permanent residence prevented many from exercising their voting rights. The achieved voting activity of 67% was only slightly over that of the preceding elections in 1997.

Curiously, all experts overestimated the performance of the former ruling coalition, the RDF. This was especially true for the state-sponsored National Public Opinion Surveys Center (NPOSC), which expected as much as 72 seats for the RDF - 21 more than it actually achieved - and Prof. G. Fotev, the Director of the Institute of Sociology, was stating until the last minute that the 20% margin between the Simeon's Movement and the RDF was "impossible" - while it actually reached 25%.

The main fluctuations in the experts' statements are shown in Table 2. Most of them, however, correctly predicted that VMRO-Gergjovden wouldn't enter the Parliament. This is especially significant, because, as the surveys reveal, this coalition gained strength particularly during the last two weeks before the elections, and it finally failed by just 0.37% to cross the barrier and enter into the Parliament [3] .

THE KING AND HIS MEN

back to top

Bulgarian king Simeon II was exiled from Bulgaria as a nine year old child in 1946. At these times Bulgaria was de facto occupied by Red Army troops, and the communists, rapidly enhancing their political influence, were eager to defeat the monarchy as a main obstacle to assuming all power. Thus, following a referendum, the monarchy was abolished in 1946 with an overwhelming majority, and while there remain many objections regarding the legality of this act, very few deny the current Republican form of Bulgarian rule. The former king, apparently a man of passion, always used to speak of Bulgaria with affection. He preserved his affiliation to the Orthodox Church - which caused around his birth an argument with the Vatican and the Italian royal family -, and he was popular for his beautifully accented, seldom outdated Bulgarian. His unusual fate left him in the memory of the ordinary people - even if they had very different political views - the sentimental memory about the well-behaved, small boy, undeservedly punished by the fortune of the early death of King Boris III, the demise of his aunt, Mafalda, in a Nazi concentration camp, and the execution by the communists of his uncle, Kiril, as well as his and his family's forced exile. Despite the lack of any probability that he would one day return to the throne, Simeon quite clearly followed his predestination. In the mid-fifties, in an operetta-like ceremony far from his country, he was given the fake crown. Married to a Spanish wife, Margarita - from a rich but not noble background, and whom he preferred to some royal hopefuls - he gave Bulgarian names to all his five children - Konstantin-Assen, Kiril, Kubrat, Kardam and Kalina. Otherwise, he lived a relatively obscure life as a Madrid-based businessman until 1990, when he was exposed in a long, and then very controversial, interview for the national television, in which he avoided commenting on developments in Bulgaria. Then, hardly anybody seriously expected that he would ever return to the post-communist political scene. The former monarch epitomized fairness and morality, both of which were either almost completely missing or distorted in post-communist Bulgaria. The reformed Left, the new Right and the numerous centrist political parties were equally tainted and disgraced by their purported past links with Bulgarian communism and corruption. A number of odd parties - as many as 250 or more! - emerged in Bulgaria after 1989, such as the Conservative-Liberal, the Democratic Constitutional and the Party for European and World States, plus a couple o' dozen royalist ones. But many of them were seen mainly as front organisations, allegedly created by former secret services with the sole intention of diluting support for the main opposition party, the United Democratic Forces.

Simeon II proceeded extremely cautiously compared to other former royal offsprings, who saw in the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Balkans an immediate opportunity to return on a white horse. Former King Michael of Romania, for example, dashed back to his country in 1990, after the death of dictator Nikolae Ceaucescu, only to be denied an entry permit. He was only recently finally permitted to stay in Romania by President Iliescu. Similar was the fate of the Albanian aspirant for the royal seat, King Leka, who was involved in an adventuresome attempt to disembark with several friends on the shores of the then severest bastion of the Enver Xoxha's communist Albania, was only in 1997 allowed to enter his country that had fallen into civil unrest. He was then the only person able to travel between the number of places kept by various clans and bands, and to serve as a mediator. The Serbian crown-prince, Aleksander, failed to make any significant contribution to his country's difficult transition, since he can barely express himself in Serbian, and thus could be used simply as a decoration at some anti-Milosevic rallies. Most recently he received back some of his property, including a palace in Dedinje, the aristocratic district of Belgrade.

Instead, initially, in 1991, Simeon sent his sister, Maria Louisa, as an envoy to test the mood on the ground. She was followed by the Queen Mother, Ioanna, two years later. And only in August 1996 did Simeon decide to make his comeback, being met enthusiastically by the people. This was on the very eve of the popular strike against the failed Socialist government of Zhan Videnov, which Simeon surprisingly avoided supporting even verbally. During the private visits that he subsequently made during the next few years, the "Tsar" was careful to keep out of the controversies of the day.

One of the former leaders of the democratic opposition, Dimitur Ludzhev, vice-premier and defence minister in two governments in 1991-92, and Ahmed Dogan, leader of the MRF, both boasted publicly that they enjoyed the "Tsar's" blessing. He neither confirmed nor denied the claims, though in the turbulent spring of 1997 this apparently assisted an over-contentious coalition between Dogan's party, Ludzhev and the Green Party in entering the parliament without any significant benefit. But this move was seen as an early signal that the monarch might one day try to stick his hand into Bulgarian volatile political life.

Simeon's son Kiril - a senior fellow at "Lehman Brothers" - was in 1997 invited by President Petar Stoyanov to be his economic adviser. However, his public role, similar to that of his father, was purely symbolic - he came to Sofia just once or twice, and met the President only for brief talks.

Rumours about Simeon's final decision to enter into Bulgarian politics spread earlier this year, with the deceptively unrelated query of a group of MPs to the Con-stitutional Court about the definition of being a resident of Bulgaria in relation to the Fundamental Law's requirement for a Presidential candidate to be born in Bulgaria, and to have been a resident of the country during last five years. This clearly referred to Simeon of Koburg Gotta, who has a residential registration in the village of Banya near Plovdiv, but who quite clearly has spent much time during the last five years abroad. He arrived with the message to lead a National Movement in his name on 6 April, little more than two months before the elections, a message that left more questions than delivered answers. It was far from everything that went well both for Simeon's party and for the "Tsar" himself. A crowd of the applicant-courtiers broke down the gates of the constituent assembly hall. This act symbolically destroyed Simeon's image of a fair, reliable and candid person because of his entourage of personalities, prominent but with too contentious a deed. The court rejected the registration of the new party because its election papers had been wrongly filed. Amid speculation of a plot against the king, or a deliberately planned move in order to increase the "climax", Simeon had to resort to using the available services of already registered parties. Simeon has exploited shrewdly. Without disclosing exactly how he plans to provide for the reduced taxes, increased pensions and child allowances, and improvements to education that he promised voters on 6 June, the former monarch told Bulgarians what they had longed to hear for years: he would introduce "a new morality" in politics. Simeon II said he would not run for parliament, a decision some interpreted as an unwillingness to swear allegiance to the republican constitution. While he claims that restoring the monarchy is not "a priority" at present, opponents suggest that this may well be his goal in the long run. Meanwhile, the "Tsar's" legendary charisma was significantly undermined by his evidently too distant and vague responses to pre-election media probing - to the extent that a reporter asked him what time it was, and then thanked him for the first concrete answer that he had finally given.

Despite his initial discretion, Simeon became the first former king in post-communist Eastern Europe to enter his homeland's politics. His two "bridges" to enter the National Assembly were the Party of Women - one that received 0.38% of vote at the previous elections, and an another "National Movement", called "Oborishte" [4] and founded last year by a former UDF MP, Tosho Peykov. The latter has some, almost Nazi, claims that seriously worried many observers, but it is more than clear that Simeon simply uses their registration for his own purposes. Selection among the more than 250 parties - and some openly submitting themselves to the "Tsar" - of two of the most obscure ones is more than apparent: Simeon wants to prevent any menace to his own full domination. Quite strange, Simeon is formally a "nobody" in the coalition that has been named after him, though everybody refers to him as "the leader". He did not stand as a candidate for an MP, and it was not expected that he himself would take on the responsibilities of a Prime Minister. All his previous record, including that during the times following the removal of the communist regime, clearly proves his preference to stay behind the curtain and wait patiently for the right moment to appear on the front stage. Thus, it seemed quite reasonable for him to stay behind the high walls and "Ipon" guards in his Vrana suburban residence, far from the camera lights and reporters' queries apparently annoying him. However, his acceptance of the job was due to the enormous pressure from both his entourage and the larger public, and certainly because he had become aware that he could lose control over his proselytes without having any institutionalized position of power. And there is no doubt that the Prime Minister's assignment is certainly the most significant power point, though Bulgaria is formally a parliamentary republic. Disposing with a comfortable majority, a Prime Minister is insured against any dismissal, free to appoint and expel his ministers, and to determine the policies. Parliamentary votes of no confidence play the same role of purely moralistic and propagandist exercises - to the same extent that statements and appeals of the deprived have any real impact on the Executive President.

We could leave aside for the moment, speculations about possible future restoration of the monarchy - Simeon II repeatedly ignited such anxieties with some interviews published abroad, to later deny such intentions. Observers coined a very exact term, 'creeping monarchy', to describe Simeon's plans: it will be possibly only after accomplishing some spectacular success that the issue of changing the country's political system can be raised. Before all, he is completely aware that the large support for him does not in any way mean acceptance of the monarchy - on the contrary, the almost 18% approval for the monarchy, as has been observed by the number of poll agencies since the beginning of the 1990s, remains unchanged. People want the messenger, the personality, that differs from the rest of the representatives of the frail and ineffective Bulgarian political elite. He is primarily a naturally-grown aristocrat, a person, fluent in six languages - English, German, French, Spanish, Italian, and Arabic. Well-educated, he is an expert in business (with practical experience in running some middle-size companies), and he also has had some military training.

Mr. Koburggotski's [5] support faltered slightly when the list of SNM candidates was released. While including a number of popular personalities - TV anchors, a fashion model, a popular actor and even a magician, - it also featured a collection of faces with mediocre and even doubtful pasts. Among the handpicked teachers and provincial lawyers were individuals connected to the country's powerful, but shady, economic groupings. Those among the Bulgarians, who were aware about this, began to wonder how such a motley assortment would cohere as a party after the election. Nevertheless, the average Bulgarian voter was not confused at all: he was completely sure that his vote should go to Simeon, and even if a goat or donkey was nominated in the SNM list, it certainly should be elected…

The main "players" in the SNM could be categorised in three groups:

·                    "Velikdentsi" (literally, Easter-people) - so called because of their participation in the two government gatherings of successful young Bulgarians organized by the Iv. Kostov's, Bulgarians living mainly abroad, or also "yuppies" - young people in their early thirties and even younger, who has finished universities and colleges predominantly in Western countries, and employed by well-known banking and financial institutions in places such as New York and London. They are smart professionals, but they have little idea about the real situation, changes and problems of Bulgaria. XXXXXXXXXXX

·                    Participants in the political and socio-economic life in Bulgaria during the most troubled and dark years of the transition, who behaved in a way too different from the proclaimed by Simeon values - "New Morality and Integrity in Everything";

·                    A solid academic team of professors mainly from the Faculty of Law of Sofia University - who, like "Velikdentsi", are novices in politics, but as consultants their names has been involved in some suspicious privatizing deals.

The third group was the main source for the new leadership of the National Assembly - the speaker Ognjan Gerdzhikov (55, a professor in commercial law), his deputy Kamelia Kassabova (44, also an expert in commercial law and a former director of the bankrupt Mineralbank), the SNM parliamentary faction's head Plamen Panayotov (43, a professor in criminal law), head of the Legal Committee An. Mingova (an Assistant Professor in Civilian Process), Professor Georgi Petkanov, (54), a respected expert in taxation and financial law, the former Deputy Rector of the University and chairman of the Association of the Bulgarian Legal Experts, chaired the parliamentary rules committee before being nominated as a Minister of the Interior. As a specific "stuffing" - or, more precisely, a façade - there is a mite odd, but nevertheless eye-catching group of beautiful young females - TV anchors, fashion models, or simply someone's spouses; from these came, for example, the head of the Media Committee, Milena Milutinova. A combination of yuppies and lawyers happened to represent the basis of the new government. The government list appeared to be the most scrupulously kept secret, which means that Simeon's men followed strictly his prescription to be "masters of silence": only hours before the official introduction, journalists just got one or two second rank names, leaving them totally perplexed. New government dumbfounded most of the observers. It includes 17 persons, among them two women (Vice PM and Minister of Labour and Social Policy - 45, an electrical engineer and MA in Finances, and director of the Albena Privatizational Fund), and the Minister of Environment Dolores Arsenova (37, with two university degrees - in law and pedagogy - a lawyer and a consultant, and a postgraduate student in political science. During the course of the development of the government, S. Koburggotski avoided the two principles that were declared in advance: not to pick MPs for ministerial positions, and not to charge the Vice PMs with specific portfolios. The first surprise - to some degree, guessed - of two mayors-socialists in their "personal" quality - about which we shall speak more later on. The second surprise were those personalities nominated for the most important posts: the first diplomat became the mathematician Solomon Passy, 45 years old, known as the main NATO lobbyist in Bulgaria - he was the first, as an MP of the Green Party in the Grand National Assembly in 1991, to demand NATO membership for Bulgaria, and he later founded and chaired the Atlantic Club. For the second time since 1990 a lawyer heads the Ministry of Defence - 43 year-old Nikolay Svinarov from Shoumen, who graduated cum laude from the Sofia University Law Faculty and Vratza school for Reserve Officers, while Minister of the Interior was given to the Taxation and Financial Law Professor G. Petkanov. Far more able to be predicted appeared to be the Economic team, which lowers meaningfully the average age: as young as 31, Nikolay Vassilev, with university degrees from Hungary, the USA and Japan, a Vice President of Lazard Capital Markets Investment bank, head of its emerging markets department and author of the first Bulgarian stock exchange index becomes Vice PM and Minister of Economy. The Ministry of Finance is headed by 35 year-old Milen Vulchev, who graduated from the University for National and World Economy in Sofia and took his MBA from the Rochester University, New York, and was Master in Financial Engineering from Massachusetts Technology Institute; until very recently he was responsible at Merryl Lynch headquarters in London for the whole of Eastern Europe, including Russia and the former Soviet Republics.

Only one among the new ministers is older, though just by one year, than the 64 year old Prime Minister - the composer and Deputy Rector of the Musical Academy Bozhidar Abrashev, who became Minister of Culture [6] . Among the prevailing 30-35 year-old ministers (a columnist entitled his analysis 'Generation of 1966 comes to power') - is also the first ever active magistrate to head the Ministry of Justice, Anguel Stankov, as well as the new minister of Transportation and Communications, with an MA in Economics and International Management from US universities, Plamen Petrov, who created the largest cable operator on the Bulgarian market, Cable Bulgaria. Among the slightly older ones is the 46 year-old professor in philology, Vladimir Atanassov - Minister of Education and Science, as well as the 53 year-old physician with three specializations - internal diseases, cardiochirurgy and rheumatology -, Doctor of Medicine Bozhidar Finkov, as Minister of Health.

Though clearly authorities in their fields, all ministers have to prove themselves in the future - only a couple of Mayors have managerial experience, at a relatively low level. Most of them were practically unknown to the large Bulgarian public.

The Movement for Rights and Freedoms as a coalition partner considered as important the Ministries of Agriculture, Environment and Waters, Regional Development and Public Works and Education, so that it could protect the rights of its supporters. Emel Etem, Deputy Chairman of the party, made this statement in response to a BTA question as to which are the ministries in which the MRF wants to be represented if talks open on a coalition cabinet. In her view, a change should be made in the structure of the Council of Ministers, and an agency or a committee for foreign and domestic investment set up. In addition, it was expected that the MRF would receive a Vice Premier's position, five or six deputy ministerial positions, and regional governorships in the regions with a predominantly Turkish population, especially that of Kirdjali. Here, S. Koburggotski was shrewd and cautious enough to resist, giving the coalition partner two ministerial positions (the attractive Agriculture and one without portfolio, responsible for natural disasters and industrial incident hazards), three or four deputy ministerial chairs and the lucrative Sofia governorship. The MRF nominated two relatively unknown politicians for these positions - successful Mayors of relatively small towns in the areas with predominantly Turkish populations, Mehmet Dikme (35, a specialist in tobacco processing) and Nedjet Mollov (51, a machine engineer); this could be accepted as an expression of dissatisfaction, but also matched the general shape of the new government, which lacked any strong political figures. The real surprise with the new government actually came from the nomination of two prominent personalities from the BSP - Mayors of the 4th largest city of Rousse, Dimitur Kalchev (51, a machine engineer connected with Multigroup, which is considered to have a considerable influence over the present government), and of Blagoevgrad, Kostadin Paskalev (40, a teacher of mathematics). Both they were elected for a second consecutive term this time as "independent" candidates, as the new political tactics of the former communists suggested. Both of them, however, were not only openly supported by the BSP, but Paskalev remains a loyal member and was considered as a prospective candidate for Prime Minister in case the BSP had the majority. Mr. Kalchev and Mr. Paskalev were not only given important sectors to manage - respectively, State Administration as well as Regional Amendment, and Public Works - while no formal negotiations with the BSP were held, there has been suspicion of such - but Paskalev was also given the status of a Vice PM - one that was denied to the MRF. In this way the BSP appears to be in a unique situation - both in the government and in opposition.

There is, however, an internal circle of politicians around Simeon II - those who intentionally neither stood as candidates in the election race, nor entered in the government, but quite apparently have considerable impact both over personnel selection and policy shaping. This is what creates a lot of fear among the thinking public. Members of this internal circle are the "Pazardjik connection" people - Nikolay Marinov, 53, an electrical engineer, who has since 1974 been living in New York, where he made a fortune in the real estate business, as well as the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the 47th session of the UN General Assembly, Stoyan Ganev, who remained in the USA with his Russian wife and is heavily involved with Moonitie's structures. Ganev became "Director" of the PM's chancellery, but his performance goes far beyond purely administrative functions. Both these people, together with the former students militant leader, Emil Koshlukov, exercise enormous influence over the former king both in personnel selection and in policy making. This persuasion could be seen in the presence of too many representatives of the otherwise obscure town of Pazardjik among the MPs. Against expectations, outside of the parliament and the government remained Stoyan Denchev, long-time public official and chief secretary of the Council of Ministers under the PM, L. Berov, former MP from the MRF, former ambassador, a businessman and a Vice President of the Multigroup. Andrey Gyurkovski, 60, who spent more than half of his life in Paris and has been Vice President of the Swiss-Swedish concern ABB, was among the main sponsors of Simeon's election campaign. Another close advisor from the shadows is the pronounced monarchist and anticommunist Konstantin Ivanov, an émigré from two decades in Belgium; some insiders claim that he is the main ideologue of the Simeon II National Movement, who persuaded Simeon to enter Bulgarian politics. Other members of this inner circle seem to be the cardiochirurgian Professor Aleksander Chirkov, a Gypsy by background, who once escaped to Germany to develop both his medical- and business-running talent, former UDF MP and prominent monarchist Dimitur Ivanov, as well as the Movement's treasurer Maksim Dimov, who like Stoyan Denchev also used to be an MRF MP. Some of the new government's economic ideas are considered to have been suggested by Vladimir Kvint, a residing Professor of Economics in New York and of Russian Jewish background. These are the people who, with the possible exception of Stoyan Ganev and E. Koshlukov, prefer to stay away from the spotlight, but who are the most crucial players of contemporary Bulgarian politics.

*

*        *

Parliamentary elections in Summer 2001 were among the rare occasions when the attention of the international media focused on Bulgaria. Indeed, the first reason was the extraordinary example of the former king's returning to his former kingdom - already a confirmed Republic - as a Prime Minister. This experiment is monitored carefully by Simeon's 'colleagues' in neighbouring countries such as Albania, Romania, Serbia and, probably also, Greece, 'colleagues' who encounter more troubles in their everlasting aspiration to regain their crowns. Simeon himself laughs when asked if he is striving to become, one day, a king of Bulgaria "… A lot of people would say, 'He never made it to king, his attempt at president was disqualified and now he's running for Parliament. Next thing he'll be a candidate for municipal alderman'" He adds more seriously: "The last thing we need now is an additional debate on such a big issue. I have this historic baggage on my shoulders. But we want economic issues to be of the highest priority, without a big philosophical discussion over monarchy and the republic at this stage" [7] . One of the leading European newspapers [8] called these events in Bulgaria "a story worthy of any historical romance". However, people expected wonders from Simeon - some believed that he will, as a magician, quickly raise their incomes to the level of those in EU countries, while other more sober, but equally disappointed, wanted a gradual improvement in the business climate, a curb on corruption, and a general introduction of European moral and ethical standards. EU enlargement commissioner Guenter Verheugen, with the language of a diplomatic courtoisie, was very sharp in denouncing the unrealistic and deluding promises of the new majority. "You would need magical powers for that. It is a Harry Potter approach," Verheugen said, referring to the character in the best-selling books of the British fiction author, J.K. Rowling. "My advice would be not to create expectations which are too great and which cannot be met, because that could lead to disappointment," he added [9] . A hundred days and more of the new government's term, and hopes that fairy tales will become true have started to evaporate. Bulgaria remains one of Eastern Europe's poorer countries, with the worst socio-economic indicators among the applicants for EU membership, and no real prospects for significant improvement in the near future. Thus, excitement surrounding SNM's victory is quickly fading, and this is apparent both from the rapid fall of the PM's rating in the opinion polls, and the rising disillusionment of the people. Instead of "sensible" augmentation of their incomes, employees and workers in the public sector failed to get the 10% raise in their salaries which had been an annual rise for them for each of the last three years, and the Christmas bonus, known as the "thirteenth salary" or "pension", was denied to everybody, save for the symbolic 20 DM given to retired people. Close relatives of MPs have received further appointments to high positions in the state administration. In addition, legislative activity was slowed down instead of being accelerated, because of the still huge quantity of legal matters to be shaped according to the requirements both of the present day and of EU standards. Even the brave promise by the new parliamentary speaker, Ognyan Gerjikov, to eradicate MPs voting with their colleagues electronic cards (journalists often count a small number of MPs present during voting, sometimes even less that the quorum, while a much higher number is indicated on the display board) seems unattainable. Furthermore, quarrels and defiance, each more momentous on the next occasion, and more so than previously, engulf the "king's" parliamentary group, while executive decisions are full of internal contradictions and even inanities.

FIG. 1. DYNAMICS OF THE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE LAST TWO GOVERNMENTS OF BULGARIA, I. KOSTOV'S (JUNE 1997-JULY 2001, AND THE CURRENT ONE OF S. KOBURGGOTSKI)

Source: Alpha Research panel national surveys, representative of the Bulgarian population aged 18 and above.

Some examples of these are the threefold increase in tax on natural gas, and the introduction of VAT on medicines, which was applied on the very eve of the New York atrocities, and without proper instructions; this caused problems in pharmacies and with regular supply. However, the most significant indicator of such a tendency toward the decline of the electoral support for the SNM was the November 2001 Presidential elections. There was little doubt that Petar Stoyanov, widely respected as a successful President, would be elected for a second term - not least because of the limited powers of the head of state according to Bulgarian Constitution. Such a perspective seemed even more accomplished after the PM endorsed P. Stoyanov's ticket for a second term. However, the Bulgarian electorate arranged another "joke", contradicting all pollsters' predictions: P. Stoyanov was beaten and had to make way for the highest job in the state to go to Mr. Georgi Purvanov, the leader of the Socialist Party. He emerged in the beginning as a candidate without a chance, and most of the pollsters did not even expect him to succeed in reaching the second round. Explaining the outcomes of the Presidential elections, most observers initially saw the reason in the identification of P. Stoyanov with the previous ruling coalition that had been blamed for all the plights of Bulgaria. But with time it becomes more and more apparent that, with their vote, Bulgarians had shown in addition their rapid disillusionment in the new government. By the end of the year, every other Bulgarian believed that the government was not doing well towards improving people's standards of living, as it had promised before the elections. According to one public opinion poll[10] , no more than 3.3 % of the respondents expressed their opinion that problems concerning people's prosperity are being successfully solved, while 40.7% find the Cabinet's performance to be mediocre, and less than 1/4 (24.7%) good. Two of the most pressing problems in the country - unemployment and corruption - are evaluated with different figures but all negatively: 58.8% and 38.2% respectively think that the Cabinet's efforts towards solving the problems have failed. Only 45 of the participants in the poll think that the Cabinet has made progress in reviving the Bulgarian economy - figures which may even be explained away due to some errors in the poll processing. According to the Noema survey, if there were to be parliamentary elections today, 30.3% will not even go to the polls, 13.7% of those who would vote would cast their ballot for the Simeon II National Movement, 15.2% for the Coalition for Bulgaria and 9.8% for the United Democratic Forces [11] . Something even more significant is that the charismatic leader of the self-styled movement, the former Bulgarian king who later became a Prime Minister, has lost much of the voter confidence that brought him to power in June 2001 [12] : while in September, some 68% of the voters supported Koburggotski, his December rating fell to about 46%. Analysts ascribe the loss of confidence largely to the growing poverty in the country, which during the hard winter has been felt more painfully with the introduction of higher heating and electricity prices and significant increases in many taxes - instead of the promised reductions. According to the poll, some 80% of the population does not have any savings, about half has had to cut their expenses, including the most essential ones, and about 7% characterize their lives as "miserable".

It is quite normal for a working government, especially one that has difficult tasks, such as to carry out an unpopular reform that causes closures of ineffective enterprises and industries, and upsets everyone's life considerably, to lose popular support. However, as Fig. 1 illustrates, the current government demonstrated a far earlier exhaustion of popular support than its predecessor: in December 2001, after less than five months in office, the ratio of approval-disapproval was 56%:41% - a level that I. Kostov's government had only in 1999, after 1 1/2 years in office. Using a different methodology, the MBMD agency observed the same tendency: it was within not more than 3-4 months that S. Koburggotski's government fell from the record 68% of approval at his swearing-in (I. Kostov's government had then 62-63% of approval) to the values leaning towards the 50:50 of approval-disapproval, a level that the preceding government had reached after an year at office.

It is still probably premature to predict a complete failure of this government that was regarded with such high hopes among the large population. Such a blunder would be, above all, a significant blow to the country already heavily ravaged by twelve years of fruitless transition. It will without doubt throw much farther into the vague future any hopes for Bulgaria's entry into the EU and NATO. Moreover, most of the record of the current government, together with its inability not only to accomplish the generously promised wonders, but also to improve and continue those good practices that were tested during the previous government, leaves little optimism that the worst of the predictions by observers will come true. Recent internal quarrels in the majority faction in the parliament, and - even more serious - developments within the judiciary where some senior judges challenged the legitimate status of the country's top magistrates, suggest that the very statehood might be put in jeopardy even after the ethnic strife that tainted most of the neighboring states, and with no external menace for Bulgaria at all.

Endnotes

back to top

[1] Zhorzh Ganchev, a Bulgarian émigré until 1990, who advertised himself as a close friend and fencing trainer of M. Thatcher, R. Reagan and other celebrities and their children, a Hollywood star and producer, etc., was able to get as much as 18% of the votes in the first democratic presidential elections (1992), and was able to enter in subsequent parliaments with groups of 10-15 MPs of his political party, the Bulgarian Business Bloc (BBB), which, however, soon after became victims of internal feuding and clashes. The most heavy blow that Ganchev - a self-styled politician, often compared with Zhirinovski - suffered in 2000 was when a group of defectors from the BBB managed to re-register it at the court without Ganchev himself and his closest lieutenants; Ganchev registered a new party - " Zhorzh's Bloc". The "new" BBB got just 162 votes - compared with 4.73% (245,849 votes) in 1994 and 4.93 per cent, or 209,796 votes, in 1997.

[2] 64,929 Bulgarian citizens, living abroad, voted, while the number had not exceeded several thousand in the previous elections. More than half that number - 38,840 - came from Turkey. A total of 40,492 votes from Turkey and the former Soviet Central Asian republics were added to the votes in Dobrich. VMRO stated that 25% from each vote in Dobrich had been transferred to the MRF.

[3] VMRO was part of the RDF coalition in the previous National Assembly - having two MPs - but left it several months before the expiration of the term. It developed during the last years into a clamorous political grouping with some far right predisposition, nationalist-chauvinist mood, and - so strange for the predominantly young age affiliation - a high degree of conservatism. They made a coalition for the 2001 elections with the eccentric movement Gergjovden (St. George's Day), which emerged from the TV show "Hushove" (the name of the rebels during the Turkish rule over Bulgaria). During the brief time before the elections, both failed to send clear signals to their possible electorate - as expected, young patriotically minded Bulgarians, who believe in a strong Bulgarian state as a precondition for making alliances with EU, NATO, and other international bodies. Some surprise came from the fact that young people (18-35) revealed some preference not so much towards VMRO-Gergjovden, as had been expected, and towards NMSII, which nominated the youngest MP candidates, but to the RDF.

[4] Place in Sredna Gora mountain, where in 1876 was convened the first Bulgarian "national assembly" that decided to organize the April uprising against the Turkish rule.

[5] There has been confusion as to how to approach the royal person, who chose a senior political position in a republican polity. President Stoyanov found a fair solution to the situation: when he handed to the leader of the majority a mandate for making the government, he explained, that until that very moment, he had approached Simeon as "His Majesty" because of respect. However, since Simeon has become a PM in a republic, there is no reason for any further use of such a royal attribute, and thus the name Simeon Borisov Koburggotski received formal approval for the official use. Most of his followers still continue to call him "His Majesty", but by and large the public and the media were happy to accept the President's proposal.

[6] No other special reason for picking him for this responsible position, not of primary importance, but loaded with great expectations during these hard times for Bulgarian culture, was regularly quoted, bar the fact that he composed on oratorio devoted to Simeon.

[7] The New York Times, June 17, 2001.

[8] The Financial Times, London, 20 November 2001.

[9] Reuters, 17 January 2002.

[10] Data from a national representative survey by the Noema polling agency. The survey was conducted from December 20, 2001 till January 2, 2002.

[11] Due to variations in the question asked, or other occasional factors, other recent polls give slightly different but equally low support for the current majority. Answers to the question as to whom they would vote for if the elections were held today:

* The newly established party led by the popular Mayor of Sofia, formerly with the UDF.

Confidence in the Bulgarian government, headed by Prime Minister Saxe-Coburg fell by 13% in January compared to the results from November, results from a conducted survey by the sociological agency Alpha Research between January 11 and January 18 show. 43% of the Bulgarians still trust the Cabinet, but the negative attitude grew by 10%, and reached the level of 51%.

[12] "Novinar" daily, 3 January 2002; "RFE/RL Newsline," 4 January 2002. According to the Alpha Research survey, conducted in the second half of January, the rating of several ministers goes up - the rating of Foreign Minister Passy, for example, has increased. The rating of Gen. Boyko Borissov, Chief Secretary of the Interior Ministry, continues to go up, reaching an astonishing 86%. In spite of the drop in confidence in the government, the rating of Prime Minister Saxe-Coburg, still remains positive and high. 30% of the Bulgarians think that Simeon Saxe-Coburg manages with his duties as prime minister worse than they had expected, results from a poll, conducted by polling agency LINKS show (quoted by novinite.com, 3 February 2002). 23% of those surveyed say that the prime minister manages his responsibilities badly but that does not disappoint them since they had expected that. 28% responded that the prime minister manages as well as was expected, while only 4% commented that Saxe-Coburg does his work better than expected. It is interesting to note, sociologists comment, that the negative assessment of the PM's governance does not necessarily reflect in a negative attitude towards the prime minister's personality, since his rating remains high. Six months after his active involvement in politics, he is primarily being considered a "historical personality" (32%). 29%, think of him primarily as prime minister, 15% as a politician and 13% as a king (novinite.com, 3 Feb. 2002).